The complications of "Prufrock" involve from the poem's beginning a moredirect transformation of the dramatic monologue than does "Gerontion" when thepronouns that "I" uses suggest the presence of an unspecified listener. In manydramatic monologues the listener is also not specified, and the reader is invited to takeover the role of listener in a one-sided conversation. In "Prufrock," however,it is not clear whether a real conversation is being dramatically presented, whether the"I" is having an internal colloquy with himself, or whether the reader is beingaddressed directly. The "you" that is "I"'s counterpart stands in twoplaces at once, both inside and outside Prufrock's mind and inside and outside scenes thatcan with difficulty be imagined based on the minimal details provided. The reader'ssituation resembles the position of the viewer of Velásquez's "Las Meninas," inwhich a mirror invites an identification with the observers of the scene depicted in thepainting while the painting's geometry indicates that the illusion of that identificationcan be sustained only by ignoring obvious details. Reader and viewer stand both inside andoutside the frame of an illusion that cannot be sustained.
AESTHETICISM: (1) In general, any literary movement that encourages critical or artistic focus on the experience of beauty rather than focuses on didactic messages or seeking truth. (2) More specifically, a Victorian literary movement in the 19th Century spearheaded by Walter Pater. Pater believed the goal of art was to make those experiencing it live their lives more intensely and encourage the pursuit of beauty.
His entire existence is engulfed in his melancholia. Hamlet's words, thoughts, interactions and most tangibly his actions make his heavy-heartedness an undeniable reality.
Accordingly, in Augustine's view, any hypothetically perfect things (like God or heaven in Christian theology) by definition do not and cannot change, and therefore these perfect things must not experience time as imperfect humanity does. They are sub specie aeternitatis, outside of time completely and viewing all things in the bubble at time simultaneously. Accordingly, states of time (past, present, and future) are merely illusions we experience. The past only appears to be over and the future only appears not to have happened yet because our mortal perception is limited to the present moment rather than experiencing all reality at once. In Saint Augustine's thinking, perfect and spiritual beings outside of time experience or observe past, present, and future simultaneously. For Saint Augustine, this idea of time allows God to have knowledge of future events and choices humans make while preserving human free will, suggesting God can know what choices we will make tomorrow (because we actually have already made the choices), without God necessarily causing those choices to happen through his own influence--foreknowledge without causation. In terms of God's perceptions, all those future choices already happened and are done with--humans just don't know it yet.
Essays on Truth And Reality: F.H. Bradley: …
Bradley’s political views are said to have been conservative, thoughnot of a narrowly doctrinaire kind. Although his writings reveal areligious temperament, he seems (judging by a letter of 1922) to havefound the evangelical religiosity of his father’s household oppressive,and, perhaps in consequence, the attitude to Christianity displayedlater in his writings exhibits a certain ambivalence; on the whole, heappears to have been a freethinker. (To imagine growing up amongst themembers of the Clapham Sect, we might use John Sutherland’s suggestionthat the characters of Edmund and Fanny in Jane Austen’sMansfield Park give us some idea of what they would havebeen like.)
Essays on Truth And Reality [F.H
Bradley continues to criticize traditional logic when he turns fromjudgment to inference. Just as he rejected the Aristotelian account ofjudgments as combinations of subject and predicate, he rejectsAristotelian syllogistic (for the same reason as he later rejectsMill’s canons of induction): it misses the fact that reasoning can takeplace only through the generality involved in universals. Universalsare thus essential to inference, and for this reason Hume’s account ofinference in terms of the association of ideas collapses: Humean ideasare particulars, fleeting episodes which cannot be revived byassociation. This does not mean that association of ideas isimpossible, but genuine association (which Bradley calls‘redintegration’) can involve only universals.
Essays on Truth and Reality - Forgotten Books
It is clear that much of Bradley’s criticism of his predecessors andcontemporaries expresses his hostility to the sort of psychologicalatomism evident in extreme form in Hume but equally to be foundpresupposed in accounts of judgment like those mentioned above. WhatBradley particularly objected to about such views is that theparticulars (ideas) which they treated as realities in their ownright, and out of which judgments are said to be composed, areanything but: far from being themselves genuine individuals, they areabstractions from the continuous whole of psychological life andincapable of independent existence. This is an early version of aholism which has since had many adherents. But he then goes on topoint out that judgments too involve abstractions, since the subjectmatter of any judgment is necessarily detached from its background(as, for example, ‘Julius Caesar crossed the Rubicon’detaches the river from its location and the general from his army)and this process inevitably misrepresents the way things reallyare. Thus the objections which Bradley deployed against misleadingaccounts of logic now begin to pose a threat against logic itself byeroding the integrity of the judgments which go into its inferences,and he ends Principles in a sceptical vein by suggestingthat no judgment is ever really true nor any inference fullyvalid.